5/16/2008
مأساة غزة
على عكس الكثيرين لا أرى مأساة غزة فيما يحدث من عدوان اسرائيلى مستمر وحصار وتجويع, ولكن المأساة الحقيقية والتى تفوق كل هذه المأسى هى حالة الانقسام الغير مسبوق فى تاريخ الشعب الفلسطينى اختزال القضية فى صراع سخيف على المناصب بين قادة ليس لديهم ادنى احساس بالمسؤلية فقادة حماي الذين يرفضون حتى الان اتفاق اوسلو يتمسكون بالسلطة التى جائت عبر اوسلو ! ويرون ات وجودهم بالحكومة فى غزة وهى منفصلة عن الضفة افضل من الوحدة وهم خارج الحومة وحجتهم أتهن جاءو عبر انتخابات وكأن كا مشاكل الشعب الفلسطينى من احتلال ولاجئيت وغير ذلك قد حلت ولم يبق الا ادارة المناطق الفلسطينية. أما قادة فتح فقض نفضوا ايديهم عن مسألة الانقسام وتفرغوا لمفاوضات عبثية مع اسرائيل .
وتحول طموح الشعب الفلسطينى الان الى مجرد فتح المعابر وتخفيف الحصار ومشاكل الحياة اليومية.
لا اعتقد أن قلدة اسرائيل يتمنون شىء أفصل من ذلك.
فهتيئا على حماس الحكومة وهتيئا على فتح المفاوضات اما الشعب الفلسطينى فله الله
5/15/2008
حزب الصباحى وشركاه
ما يحدث فى حزب الامة يمكن ان يلخص مهزلة الاحزاب فى مصر, فالحزب الذى نشأ بقرار من محكمة مثل الاغلبية -الساحقة من احزاب مصر - والذى قام بتأسيسه الاستاذ أحمد الصباح لم يقم بعمل واحد له علاقة بالسياسة بالرغم من ان الحزب له برنامج محترم "لزوم التاسيس" ولكن انشطته تعددت ما بين دورات فى الحلاقة وتفسير الاحلام وتنظيم رحلات االحج والعمرة. أما الانتخابات فكان للحزب موقف "تاريخى" بكل المقاييس فرئيس الحزب الذى ترشح لرئاسة الجمهورية وأخذنصف مليون جنيه من اجل الحملة الانتخابية أعلن من اول يوم فى الحملة تأييده للرئيس مبارك " المنافس له" وحضر احد المؤتمرات وهو يرتدى رابطة عنق عليها صورة الرئيس مبارك. ناهيك عن الطربوش الذى كاد يصبح رمزا للحزب.اما أخر أحداث الحزب فهو انتقال القيادةمن الصباحى الاب الى الصباحى الابن ليطبقوا التوريث على طريقتهم , والاطرف هو رد الاستاذ محمود الصباحى لاحد البرامج التليفزيونية عند سؤاله عن والده بانه اختفى ولا يعلم احد شىء عنه!! وسؤالى هنا لماذا يتحمل دافع الضرائب الدعم المقدم لمثل هذه الاحزاب الهزلية والتى لاتضيف شيئا للحياة السياسية ومن يريد سياسة فليمارسها على نفقته الخاصة
5/14/2008
الغاز المصرى فى اسرائيل
قضية تصدير الغاز المصرى لاسرائيل تعد بحق من اغرب وأسوأ القضايا المثارة حليا ليس فقط لأن اسرائيل عدو قديم جديد وجار مزعج اضافة لكونها قوة احتلال لاراضى عربية،ولكن لأن القضية مليئة بعلامات استفهام لايريد ان يجيب عنها احد مثل السعر المتدنى والذى يقل حتى عن التكلفة مما يجعل الشعب المصرى يدعم الاقتصاد الاسرائيلى على حساب قوت يومه!!,كما ان هناك تساؤل اخر حول دور رجل الاعمال حسين سالم الذى دخل فى هذا المشروع المشبوه كشريك ثم باع حصته فجأة وبأقل من قيمتها؟! فهل كان دوره مجرد محلل؟! ولماذا يبيع بسعر متدنى هو الاخر؟! أضف لذلك أن احتياطى مصر من الغاز ليس كبيرا لكى نبدده بهذا السفه على اسرائيل واسبانيا وعيرهما ونحن فى أمس الحاجة اليه!!
ويمكن ان نلخص فى ثلاث عناوين الى أى مدى هذه القضية مثيرة للاشمئزاز وان من تسببوا فى هذا المشروع ليس لديهم اى ضمير أو احساس وطنى:
1-رفع اسعار الوقود فى مصر وزيادة أسعار معظم السلع والخدمات على اثر ذلك
2-قطع امدادات المحروقات عن قطاع غزة مما يتسبب فى شلل الحياة بالقطاع وتهديد لحياة الكثير من سكانه
3-بدء تصدير الغاز المصرى لاسرائيل باقل من تكلفته وبربع الاسعار العالمية
وحسبنا الله ونعم الوكيل
5/13/2008
Israeli Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear WeaponsIsrael has not confirmed that it has nuclear weapons and officially maintains that it will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Yet the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons is a "public secret" by now due to the declassification of large numbers of formerly highly classified US government documents which show that the United States by 1975 was convinced that Israel had nuclear weapons.
History
Israel began actively investigating the nuclear option from its earliest days. In 1949, HEMED GIMMEL a special unit of the IDF's Science Corps, began a two-year geological survey of the Negev desert with an eye toward the discovery of uranium reserves. Although no significant sources of uranium were found, recoverable amounts were located in phosphate deposits.
The program took another step forward with the creation of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) in 1952. Its chairman, Ernst David Bergmann, had long advocated an Israeli bomb as the best way to ensure "that we shall never again be led as lambs to the slaughter." Bergmann was also head of the Ministry of Defense's Research and Infrastructure Division (known by its Hebrew acronym, EMET), which had taken over the HEMED research centers (HEMED GIMMEL among them, now renamed Machon 4) as part of a reorganization. Under Bergmann, the line between the IAEC and EMET blurred to the point that Machon 4 functioned essentially as the chief laboratory for the IAEC. By 1953, Machon 4 had not only perfected a process for extracting the uranium found in the Negev, but had also developed a new method of producing heavy water, providing Israel with an indigenous capability to produce some of the most important nuclear materials.
For reactor design and construction, Israel sought the assistance of France. Nuclear cooperation between the two nations dates back as far as early 1950's, when construction began on France's 40MWt heavy water reactor and a chemical reprocessing plant at Marcoule. France was a natural partner for Israel and both governments saw an independent nuclear option as a means by which they could maintain a degree of autonomy in the bipolar environment of the cold war.
In the fall of 1956, France agreed to provide Israel with an 18 MWt research reactor. However, the onset of the Suez Crisis a few weeks later changed the situation dramatically. Following Egypt's closure of the Suez Canal in July, France and Britain had agreed with Israel that the latter should provoke a war with Egypt to provide the European nations with the pretext to send in their troops as peacekeepers to occupy and reopen the canal zone. In the wake of the Suez Crisis, the Soviet Union made a thinly veiled threat against the three nations. This episode not only enhanced the Israeli view that an independent nuclear capability was needed to prevent reliance on potentially unreliable allies, but also led to a sense of debt among French leaders that they had failed to fulfill commitments made to a partner. French premier Guy Mollet is even quoted as saying privately that France "owed" the bomb to Israel.
On 3 October 1957, France and Israel signed a revised agreement calling for France to build a 24 MWt reactor (although the cooling systems and waste facilities were designed to handle three times that power) and, in protocols that were not committed to paper, a chemical reprocessing plant. This complex was constructed in secret, and outside the IAEA inspection regime, by French and Israeli technicians at Dimona, in the Negev desert under the leadership of Col. Manes Pratt of the IDF Ordinance Corps.
Both the scale of the project and the secrecy involved made the construction of Dimona a massive undertaking. A new intelligence agency, the Office of Science Liasons,(LEKEM) was created to provide security and intelligence for the project. At the height construction, some 1,500 Israelis some French workers were employed building Dimona. To maintain secrecy, French customs officials were told that the largest of the reactor components, such as the reactor tank, were part of a desalinization plant bound for Latin America. In addition, after buying heavy water from Norway on the condition that it not be transferred to a third country, the French Air Force secretly flew as much as four tons of the substance to Israel.
Trouble arose in May 1960, when France began to pressure Israel to make the project public and to submit to international inspections of the site, threatening to withhold the reactor fuel unless they did. President de Gaulle was concerned that the inevitable scandal following any revelations about French assistance with the project, especially the chemical reprocessing plant, would have negative repercussions for France's international position, already on shaky ground because of its war in Algeria.
At a subsequent meeting with Ben-Gurion, de Gaulle offered to sell Israel fighter aircraft in exchange for stopping work on the reprocessing plant, and came away from the meeting convinced that the matter was closed. It was not. Over the next few months, Israel worked out a compromise. France would supply the uranium and components already placed on order and would not insist on international inspections. In return, Israel would assure France that they had no intention of making atomic weapons, would not reprocess any plutonium, and would reveal the existence of the reactor, which would be completed without French assistance. In reality, not much changed - French contractors finished work on the reactor and reprocessing plant, uranium fuel was delivered and the reactor went critical in 1964.
History
Israel began actively investigating the nuclear option from its earliest days. In 1949, HEMED GIMMEL a special unit of the IDF's Science Corps, began a two-year geological survey of the Negev desert with an eye toward the discovery of uranium reserves. Although no significant sources of uranium were found, recoverable amounts were located in phosphate deposits.
The program took another step forward with the creation of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) in 1952. Its chairman, Ernst David Bergmann, had long advocated an Israeli bomb as the best way to ensure "that we shall never again be led as lambs to the slaughter." Bergmann was also head of the Ministry of Defense's Research and Infrastructure Division (known by its Hebrew acronym, EMET), which had taken over the HEMED research centers (HEMED GIMMEL among them, now renamed Machon 4) as part of a reorganization. Under Bergmann, the line between the IAEC and EMET blurred to the point that Machon 4 functioned essentially as the chief laboratory for the IAEC. By 1953, Machon 4 had not only perfected a process for extracting the uranium found in the Negev, but had also developed a new method of producing heavy water, providing Israel with an indigenous capability to produce some of the most important nuclear materials.
For reactor design and construction, Israel sought the assistance of France. Nuclear cooperation between the two nations dates back as far as early 1950's, when construction began on France's 40MWt heavy water reactor and a chemical reprocessing plant at Marcoule. France was a natural partner for Israel and both governments saw an independent nuclear option as a means by which they could maintain a degree of autonomy in the bipolar environment of the cold war.
In the fall of 1956, France agreed to provide Israel with an 18 MWt research reactor. However, the onset of the Suez Crisis a few weeks later changed the situation dramatically. Following Egypt's closure of the Suez Canal in July, France and Britain had agreed with Israel that the latter should provoke a war with Egypt to provide the European nations with the pretext to send in their troops as peacekeepers to occupy and reopen the canal zone. In the wake of the Suez Crisis, the Soviet Union made a thinly veiled threat against the three nations. This episode not only enhanced the Israeli view that an independent nuclear capability was needed to prevent reliance on potentially unreliable allies, but also led to a sense of debt among French leaders that they had failed to fulfill commitments made to a partner. French premier Guy Mollet is even quoted as saying privately that France "owed" the bomb to Israel.
On 3 October 1957, France and Israel signed a revised agreement calling for France to build a 24 MWt reactor (although the cooling systems and waste facilities were designed to handle three times that power) and, in protocols that were not committed to paper, a chemical reprocessing plant. This complex was constructed in secret, and outside the IAEA inspection regime, by French and Israeli technicians at Dimona, in the Negev desert under the leadership of Col. Manes Pratt of the IDF Ordinance Corps.
Both the scale of the project and the secrecy involved made the construction of Dimona a massive undertaking. A new intelligence agency, the Office of Science Liasons,(LEKEM) was created to provide security and intelligence for the project. At the height construction, some 1,500 Israelis some French workers were employed building Dimona. To maintain secrecy, French customs officials were told that the largest of the reactor components, such as the reactor tank, were part of a desalinization plant bound for Latin America. In addition, after buying heavy water from Norway on the condition that it not be transferred to a third country, the French Air Force secretly flew as much as four tons of the substance to Israel.
Trouble arose in May 1960, when France began to pressure Israel to make the project public and to submit to international inspections of the site, threatening to withhold the reactor fuel unless they did. President de Gaulle was concerned that the inevitable scandal following any revelations about French assistance with the project, especially the chemical reprocessing plant, would have negative repercussions for France's international position, already on shaky ground because of its war in Algeria.
At a subsequent meeting with Ben-Gurion, de Gaulle offered to sell Israel fighter aircraft in exchange for stopping work on the reprocessing plant, and came away from the meeting convinced that the matter was closed. It was not. Over the next few months, Israel worked out a compromise. France would supply the uranium and components already placed on order and would not insist on international inspections. In return, Israel would assure France that they had no intention of making atomic weapons, would not reprocess any plutonium, and would reveal the existence of the reactor, which would be completed without French assistance. In reality, not much changed - French contractors finished work on the reactor and reprocessing plant, uranium fuel was delivered and the reactor went critical in 1964.

The United States first became aware of Dimona's existence after U-2 overflights in 1958 captured the facility's construction, but it was not identified as a nuclear site until two years later. The complex was variously explained as a textile plant, an agricultural station, and a metallurgical research facility, until David Ben-Gurion stated in December 1960 that Dimona complex was a nuclear research center built for "peaceful purposes."
There followed two decades in which the United States, through a combination of benign neglect, erroneous analysis, and successful Israeli deception, failed to discern first the details of Israel's nuclear program. As early as 8 December 1960, the CIA issued a report outlining Dimona's implications for nuclear proliferation, and the CIA station in Tel Aviv had determined by the mid-1960s that the Israeli nuclear weapons program was an established and irreversible fact.
United States inspectors visited Dimona seven times during the 1960s, but they were unable to obtain an accurate picture of the activities carried out there, largely due to tight Israeli control over the timing and agenda of the visits. The Israelis went so far as to install false control room panels and to brick over elevators and hallways that accessed certain areas of the facility. The inspectors were able to report that there was no clear scientific research or civilian nuclear power program justifying such a large reactor - circumstantial evidence of the Israeli bomb program - but found no evidence of "weapons related activities" such as the existence of a plutonium reprocessing plant.
Although the United States government did not encourage or approve of the Israeli nuclear program, it also did nothing to stop it. Walworth Barbour, US ambassador to Israel from 1961-73, the bomb program's crucial years, primarily saw his job as being to insulate the President from facts which might compel him to act on the nuclear issue, alledgedly saying at one point that "The President did not send me there to give him problems. He does not want to be told any bad news." After the 1967 war, Barbour even put a stop to military attachés' intelligence collection efforts around Dimona. Even when Barbour did authorize forwarding information, as he did in 1966 when embassy staff learned that Israel was beginning to put nuclear warheads in missiles, the message seemed to disappear into the bureaucracy and was never acted upon.
Nuclear Weapons Production
In early 1968, the CIA issued a report concluding that Israel had successfully started production of nuclear weapons. This estimate, however, was based on an informal conversation between Carl Duckett, head of the CIA's Office of Science and Technology, and Edward Teller, father of the hydrogen bomb. Teller said that, based on conversations with friends in the Israeli scientific and defense establishment, he had concluded that Israel was capable of building the bomb, and that the CIA should not wait for an Israeli test to make a final assessment because that test would never be carried out.
CIA estimates of the Israeli arsenal's size did not improve with time. In 1974, Duckett estimated that Israel had between ten and twenty nuclear weapons. The upper bound was derived from CIA speculation regarding the number of possible Israeli targets, and not from any specific intelligence. Because this target list was presumed to be relatively static, this remained the official American estimate until the early 1980s.
The actual size and composition of Israel's nuclear stockpile is uncertain and the subject of many - often conflicting - estimates and reports. It is widely reported that Israel had two bombs in 1967, and that Prime Minister Eshkol ordered them armed in Israel's first nuclear alert during the Six-Day War. It is also reported that, fearing defeat in the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis assembled 13 twenty-kiloton atomic bombs.
Israel could potentially have produced a few dozen nuclear warheads in the period 1970-1980, and is thought to have produced sufficient fissile material to build 100 to 200 warheads by the mid-1990s. In 1986 descriptions and photographs of Israeli nuclear warheads were published in the London Sunday Times of a purported underground bomb factory at the Dimona nuclear reactor. The photographs were taken by Mordechai Vanunu, a dismissed Israeli nuclear technician. His information led some experts to conclude that Israel had a stockpile of 100 to 200 nuclear devices at that time.
By the late 1990s the U.S. Intelligence Community estimated that Israel possessed between 75-130 weapons, based on production estimates. The stockpile would certainly include warheads for mobile Jericho-1 and Jericho-2 missiles, as well as bombs for Israeli aircraft, and may include other tactical nuclear weapons of various types. Some published estimates even claimed that Israel might have as many as 400 nuclear weapons by the late 1990s. We believe these numbers are exaggerated, and that Israel's nuclear weapons inventory may include less than 100 nuclear weapons. Stockpiled plutonium could be used to build additional weapons if so decided.
There followed two decades in which the United States, through a combination of benign neglect, erroneous analysis, and successful Israeli deception, failed to discern first the details of Israel's nuclear program. As early as 8 December 1960, the CIA issued a report outlining Dimona's implications for nuclear proliferation, and the CIA station in Tel Aviv had determined by the mid-1960s that the Israeli nuclear weapons program was an established and irreversible fact.
United States inspectors visited Dimona seven times during the 1960s, but they were unable to obtain an accurate picture of the activities carried out there, largely due to tight Israeli control over the timing and agenda of the visits. The Israelis went so far as to install false control room panels and to brick over elevators and hallways that accessed certain areas of the facility. The inspectors were able to report that there was no clear scientific research or civilian nuclear power program justifying such a large reactor - circumstantial evidence of the Israeli bomb program - but found no evidence of "weapons related activities" such as the existence of a plutonium reprocessing plant.
Although the United States government did not encourage or approve of the Israeli nuclear program, it also did nothing to stop it. Walworth Barbour, US ambassador to Israel from 1961-73, the bomb program's crucial years, primarily saw his job as being to insulate the President from facts which might compel him to act on the nuclear issue, alledgedly saying at one point that "The President did not send me there to give him problems. He does not want to be told any bad news." After the 1967 war, Barbour even put a stop to military attachés' intelligence collection efforts around Dimona. Even when Barbour did authorize forwarding information, as he did in 1966 when embassy staff learned that Israel was beginning to put nuclear warheads in missiles, the message seemed to disappear into the bureaucracy and was never acted upon.
Nuclear Weapons Production
In early 1968, the CIA issued a report concluding that Israel had successfully started production of nuclear weapons. This estimate, however, was based on an informal conversation between Carl Duckett, head of the CIA's Office of Science and Technology, and Edward Teller, father of the hydrogen bomb. Teller said that, based on conversations with friends in the Israeli scientific and defense establishment, he had concluded that Israel was capable of building the bomb, and that the CIA should not wait for an Israeli test to make a final assessment because that test would never be carried out.
CIA estimates of the Israeli arsenal's size did not improve with time. In 1974, Duckett estimated that Israel had between ten and twenty nuclear weapons. The upper bound was derived from CIA speculation regarding the number of possible Israeli targets, and not from any specific intelligence. Because this target list was presumed to be relatively static, this remained the official American estimate until the early 1980s.
The actual size and composition of Israel's nuclear stockpile is uncertain and the subject of many - often conflicting - estimates and reports. It is widely reported that Israel had two bombs in 1967, and that Prime Minister Eshkol ordered them armed in Israel's first nuclear alert during the Six-Day War. It is also reported that, fearing defeat in the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis assembled 13 twenty-kiloton atomic bombs.
Israel could potentially have produced a few dozen nuclear warheads in the period 1970-1980, and is thought to have produced sufficient fissile material to build 100 to 200 warheads by the mid-1990s. In 1986 descriptions and photographs of Israeli nuclear warheads were published in the London Sunday Times of a purported underground bomb factory at the Dimona nuclear reactor. The photographs were taken by Mordechai Vanunu, a dismissed Israeli nuclear technician. His information led some experts to conclude that Israel had a stockpile of 100 to 200 nuclear devices at that time.
By the late 1990s the U.S. Intelligence Community estimated that Israel possessed between 75-130 weapons, based on production estimates. The stockpile would certainly include warheads for mobile Jericho-1 and Jericho-2 missiles, as well as bombs for Israeli aircraft, and may include other tactical nuclear weapons of various types. Some published estimates even claimed that Israel might have as many as 400 nuclear weapons by the late 1990s. We believe these numbers are exaggerated, and that Israel's nuclear weapons inventory may include less than 100 nuclear weapons. Stockpiled plutonium could be used to build additional weapons if so decided.
from: many sources
5/09/2008
سيد الفتنة

هاهو حسن نصر الله الذى لقب "بسيد المقاومة" أثناء العدوان الاسرائيلى على لبنان يتحول الى "سيد الفتنة" ويبدأ بأشعال الفتيل الذى كنا نخشاه جميعا
والسلاح الذى دحر العدوان هاهو يمتد لاخوة الوطن بالتخريب والارهاب.
فنصر الله الذى وقفنا جميعا وراءه ووجدنا فيه نموذجا لتحدى العدوان والاحتلال وللاصرار والتحدى الذى افتقدناه فى زمن الخزى العربى, وتغنى فيه البعض شعرا. هاهو يهدم هذه الصورة بعد خطابه المتشنج غير مسؤل والذى لم يشف الا عن رؤية طائفية وحزبية ضيقةالافق ولم يرتقى الى مستوى المسؤلية التى عهدناعليها حزب الله وقت الحرب الاهلية. وأيا كان القرارالحكومى الذى أدى الى هذة التصريحات والتهديدات فهو لا يبرر تعريض أمن ومستقبل وطن بكامله للخطر. واضافة الى أن المعارضة اللبنانية " الغير متجانسة بكل المقاييس" كان لها دور كبير فى تعطيل انتخاب الرئيس للان فان محاولة استعراض القوة واستخدام لهجة تصادمية فى هذا الوقت الحرج هى نوع من الاستهتار بمصير وطن وتعلية لمصالح طائفة على مصالح الوطن. وهذا ما جلبه أصحاب العمائم السوداء على العراق وهو ما لا نتمنى ان يحدث للبنان
5/07/2008
كل اضراب وأنتم بخير
مثلما كان الاضراب عشوائيا سواء فى 6 أبريل أو 4 مايو جا ئت النتائج عشوائية
فالاضراب الاول والثانى كانا مجرد تعبير عن الغضب وموقف انفعالى غير واضح الاهداف ولم تكن هناك جهة تتبناه بشكل واضح وتتفاوض حوله وانما حالة من الاحتجتج غير المدروس فكانت النتائج قرار غير مدروس لامتصاص غضب الشعب واحتواء حالة الاسخط , وكانت العلاوة " السياسية" التى أعلنها الرئيس مبارك। وبالرغم من أن هذه العلاوة لم تكن تكفى لمواجهة الغلاء الذى أنهك قوى الشعب المصرى الا أن أكثر الناس كان يخشى من تبعات هذه العلاوة ومن طريقة تدبير مواردها, وهو ماحدث فكانت الزيادات فى الاسعار التى اعلنتها الحكومة
وبالرغم من أن بعض اجراءات الحكومة كانت منطقية مثل رفع أسعار السجائر ورفع الاعفاء الضريبى عن شركات المناطق الحرة لكن باقى الاجراءات كانت تمثل صدمة للكثيرين لدرجة أنها لغت أثر العلاوة الاخيرة,فالعلاوة التى يستفيد منها معظم المصريين هناك فئات للن تستفيد منها وأغلبهم من البسطاء أضف لذلك طابور البطالة , وكل هذه الفئات كل ما طرأ عليها هو زيادة الاسعار .
وانا اتسائل لو ان المواطنين خيروا بين العلاوة الاخيرة وما تلاها من زيادة أسعار وبين عدمها فماذا سيكون الاختيار!؟
5/04/2008
المحافظات والكم المهمل
قرارات انشاء محافظتين جديدتين واعلان حدودهما بشكل مفاجىء ثم تعديلها بقرار جمهورى اشعر كثيرمن سكان هاتين المحافظتين وغيرهم أنانهم كمواطنين مجرد أشياء يتم تحريكها من قبل صناع القرار دون ارادة او اختيار لاصحاب الشأنوالقرار يأتى غالبا عشوائى و بعيد كل البعد عن الواقع وعن الحياة اليومية لمن يخصهم القرارفاختيار المحافظين يأتى بالتعيين و كذلك رؤساء المدن والاحياء, وحتى المجالس المحلية التى لا تتمتع بشىء يذكر من المسؤليات يتم فرض نتائجها عبر انتخابات صورية. ولكن ان يعيش الانسان فى محافظة ما ويفاجأ أنه أصبح ينتمى لمحافظة أخرى دون اى تمهيد" ولا أقول استفتاء أو أو استقصاء اراء سكان المحافظة" فهذا يعطى انطباع للمواطنين انه لاقيمة لرأيهم أو بالأحرى لاقيمة لهم وان من اتخذ القرار اعلم منهم بشؤنهم.
5/03/2008
الشيخ يوسف والاضراب
تعجبت كثيرا من فتوى الشيخ يوسف البدرى عن اضراب 4 مايو . ليس لأنه تطوع لاصدار فتوى مجانية لم تطلب منه فهذا ليس جديد عليه لكن المزعج هو اقحام الدين فى مسألة شائكةكهذه تتعدد الاراء فيها والمواقف خاصة انه لم يحدد الاضراب الذى تصحبه عمليات تخريب او تعطيل للحياة العامة وانما اطلق فتواه على الاضراب بشكل عام حتى ان كان سلمى وسواء كان شامل او محدود أو شامل. وأنا شخصيا بقيام اضراب دون تنظيم ووضوح اهدافه وشكل الاضراب ووضوح الجهة التى تدعوا اليه " لا التى تنضم اليه" ولكن لا اقبل أن أن يوظف الدين لخدمة موقف سياسى لفرض نوع من الوصاية ضد حق اصيل لأى مواطن أن يمتنع عن العمل بشكل مؤقت "دون تعرض امن أو مصالح الاخرين للخطر " كنوع من التعبير عن رفض أوضاع معينة.
اما الاكثر سخافة فى الفتوى هو دعوته للرئيس مبارك بعدم ترك الحكم " أسوة بالخليفة عثمان" وهذا يذكرنا بالفتوى الاكثر سخفا التى أصدرها رئيس جمعية أنصار السنة بدمنهور حول التوريث.
والمعلوم ان هذه الافكار الغريبة مردود عليها من علماء محترمين ووأمناء . وأنها لا تتفق مع الفطرة والمنطق وتعاليم الاسلام الذى على الشورى كوسيلة لادارة شؤن الامة. لا القهر والتشبث بالسلطة والتوريث.
فليرحمنا الله من هذه الفتاواى واصحابها
5/01/2008
صحفيون ضد الحرية
ماحدث فى نقابة الصحفيين من اشتباك بين بعض الصحفيين من ناحية والنقيب والبعض الاخر من ناحية أخرى ومنع عقد مؤتمر "مصريون ضد التمييز" يعتبر فضيحة بكل المقاييس
فبغض النظر عن طبيعة المؤتمر وطبيعة من يحضرونه فلا يمكن لاحد مهما كان انتمائه أو حتى منصبه النقابى ان ينصب نفسه وليا على النقابة وأعضائها, واذا عجز الصحفى عن
استخدام قلمه فى التعبير عن موقفه واللجوء الى يديه فانه يكتب شهادة وفاة الصحفى داخله ويتحول الى شىء أخر "بلطجى" ولو كانت المشكلة فى المؤتمر هى حضور البهائيين أو بعض من اصحاب المواقف السياسية التى لا تتفق مع من اعترضوا على عقد المؤتمر فكان الاجدى بهم الحضور والتعبير عن مواقفهم بشكل متحضر ,خاصة أن النقابة اتسعت لكثير من المؤتمرات والفعاليات السياسية لتيارات مختلفة,والمفترض أنها نقابة اصحاب فكر وراى بالدرجة الاولى لا بلطجية .
اتمنى ان يجرى تحقيق حقيقى حول ماحدث وتعلن نتائجه أو ليستقيل النقيب كرد على ماحدث
4/29/2008
الاغانى الوطنية فى زمن الفيديو كليب
أتعجب كثيرا من اصرار المسؤلين بالتليفزيون المصرى على تقديم كلا من هيثم شاكر وتامر حسنى أكثر من مرة فى أغانى وطنية ,بل والظهور فى زى عسكرى والتصوير فى مواقع عسكرية!!. والمشكلة ليست فى أدائهما الفنى ولا مستوى الأغانى التى يقدمانها ,لكن لأنهما مدانان بالتهرب من الخدمة العسكرية والتزوير .
واذا كانت هذه هى القدوة التى يقدمها المسؤلون عن الاعلام لشبابنا فى الوطنية اذن لماذا التشدد مع من يتخلف عن التجنيد أو حتى عن الاستدعاء بعد أدائه للخدمة!؟
واذا كانت هذه هى القدوة التى يقدمها المسؤلون عن الاعلام لشبابنا فى الوطنية اذن لماذا التشدد مع من يتخلف عن التجنيد أو حتى عن الاستدعاء بعد أدائه للخدمة!؟
أرى ان التساهل فى مثل هذه الامور فيه اهدار لقيم كثيرة وهدم لاشياء يصعب بنائها أو حتى اصلاحها
4/25/2008
Good morning Sinai

Sinai peninsula, in fact, occupies a distinctive position on the Egypt's map, as it locates the north eastern part of Egypt. From the east, it is bordered by el-Aqaba Gulf, and by Suez Canal from the west. The whole Sinai coast's lenghth is about 870 Km, i.e, 30% of the total of Egypt's coasts (2400 Km).
Sinai's area, however, constitutes 6% of Egypt's area, about 61.000 Km square. It is deemed to be the land of minerals and wealth, as it harbours great deal of minerals and oilfields, cool, iron, cement, black and white sand, and exotic herbs.
The historical significance of Sinai could be simply ascribed to its unique spot, as it is the eastern gate of Egypt. Sinai has witnessed many wars for defending Egypt; the war between Ramses II and the Hittites, but also attested the oldest Qadsh peace treaty concluded in 1270 B.C.
The prophet's land and the cradle of divine messages is, also, Sinai, via which the Father of the prophets, "Ibrahim" had crossed. Furthermore, Sinai was the place in which Moses had spoken to God from Mount El-Tour. This holy land, in addition, had witnessed the Youssef's cross to Egypt , and the passing of the sacred family while in the Coptic time.
Islamic conquest to Egypt, however, has been realized at the hands of Amr Ibn Al-As through Sinai.
Sinai was and will remain the strategic spot for defending the homeland of Egypt, it has witnessed many severe wars; 1956, 1967 and 1973 wars.
The Egyptian diplomacy, as a matter of fact, played an important role in regaining Sinai, when President Sadat's initiative came to demonstrate the Egyptian desire to bring about peace. In November 1977, he visited Israel, then came Camp David's meetings to yield the 1979 peace accord between Egypt and Israel.
By virtue of such accord Israel withdrew from Sinai, but little Taba was claimed to be belonged to Israel. Egypt, never gave up but resorted to the international arbitration, which announced on September 29, 1988 that Taba, the cherished piece of Egypt's soil, is an Egyptian land.
Today, Sinai testifies the implementation of the national project (1994 - 2017) for developing all walks of life throught the giant 75-billion plan.
source: arabic news
Sinai's area, however, constitutes 6% of Egypt's area, about 61.000 Km square. It is deemed to be the land of minerals and wealth, as it harbours great deal of minerals and oilfields, cool, iron, cement, black and white sand, and exotic herbs.
The historical significance of Sinai could be simply ascribed to its unique spot, as it is the eastern gate of Egypt. Sinai has witnessed many wars for defending Egypt; the war between Ramses II and the Hittites, but also attested the oldest Qadsh peace treaty concluded in 1270 B.C.
The prophet's land and the cradle of divine messages is, also, Sinai, via which the Father of the prophets, "Ibrahim" had crossed. Furthermore, Sinai was the place in which Moses had spoken to God from Mount El-Tour. This holy land, in addition, had witnessed the Youssef's cross to Egypt , and the passing of the sacred family while in the Coptic time.
Islamic conquest to Egypt, however, has been realized at the hands of Amr Ibn Al-As through Sinai.
Sinai was and will remain the strategic spot for defending the homeland of Egypt, it has witnessed many severe wars; 1956, 1967 and 1973 wars.
The Egyptian diplomacy, as a matter of fact, played an important role in regaining Sinai, when President Sadat's initiative came to demonstrate the Egyptian desire to bring about peace. In November 1977, he visited Israel, then came Camp David's meetings to yield the 1979 peace accord between Egypt and Israel.
By virtue of such accord Israel withdrew from Sinai, but little Taba was claimed to be belonged to Israel. Egypt, never gave up but resorted to the international arbitration, which announced on September 29, 1988 that Taba, the cherished piece of Egypt's soil, is an Egyptian land.
Today, Sinai testifies the implementation of the national project (1994 - 2017) for developing all walks of life throught the giant 75-billion plan.
source: arabic news
4/24/2008
Iraq executions follow apparently unfair trials
Twenty-eight people have been executed in Iraq this week following what appear to have been hasty and unfair trials. Those executed were arrested in clashes that took place in the past three weeks.
Amnesty International has said that, for them to be arrested, sentenced and executed within such a short period raises serious concerns about the trial process. The organization has called on the Iraqi authorities to disclose all relevant information about these trials, including whether those executed had access to legal representation or not.
"The circumstances of these executions make it urgent for the Iraqi authorities to establish a moratorium on the death penalty," Amnesty International said today.
Amnesty International has repeatedly expressed its concerns about the trials conducted by criminal courts in Iraq, and whose procedures fall short of international standards for fair trials.
"The Iraqi government argues that reinstating capital punishment would curb the widespread violence in the country," said Amnesty International. "The reality, however, is that violence has continued unabated and the death penalty has not been a deterrent."
The death penalty is being used extensively since its reintroduction in 2004 and hundreds of people have been sentenced to death after grossly unfair trials. Amnesty International opposes the death penalty in all circumstances as a violation of the right to life and as the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.
18 April 2008
source: www.amnesty.org
Amnesty International has said that, for them to be arrested, sentenced and executed within such a short period raises serious concerns about the trial process. The organization has called on the Iraqi authorities to disclose all relevant information about these trials, including whether those executed had access to legal representation or not.
"The circumstances of these executions make it urgent for the Iraqi authorities to establish a moratorium on the death penalty," Amnesty International said today.
Amnesty International has repeatedly expressed its concerns about the trials conducted by criminal courts in Iraq, and whose procedures fall short of international standards for fair trials.
"The Iraqi government argues that reinstating capital punishment would curb the widespread violence in the country," said Amnesty International. "The reality, however, is that violence has continued unabated and the death penalty has not been a deterrent."
The death penalty is being used extensively since its reintroduction in 2004 and hundreds of people have been sentenced to death after grossly unfair trials. Amnesty International opposes the death penalty in all circumstances as a violation of the right to life and as the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.
18 April 2008
source: www.amnesty.org
4/23/2008
اضراب 4 مايو
بعد انتهاء اضراب6 أبريل وما تبعه من أحداث وشعور الكثيرين ممن تبنوه ودعوا اليه بأنه لم يحقق ما كانوا يطمحون اليه ولم يحقق التأثير أو بالاحرى الضغط الكافى.
ومن ثم بدأت العوة لاضراب جديد كنوع من التحدى للنظام ولتأكيد الارادة فى التعبير عن السخط من كثير مما يحدث
ولكن اذاكان الاضراب السابق لم يكتب له التنظيم الكافى ولم تتبنه جهة بعينها ولم تتضح بشكل كافى أهدافه بل وتنصلت منه بعض القوى السياسية ولم يكن متحمسا له سوى تيار اليسار وبعض فئات الشباب.
واذا كان لابد من القيام باضراب فلماذا يكون 4 مايو؟! وهل اذا فشل يكون اضراب 4 يونيو هو الحل؟! ونحن حتى الان لم نعرف بشكل حقيقى نشأة فكرة اضراب 6 أبريل بالرغم من الادعاء الساذج بأن نشأته دعوة على برنامج فيس بوك وتقديم الشابة اسراء ككبش فداء لتغطية عجز الامن عن الحصول على معلومات سليمة.
اذن اذا كنا نود ان نتبنى ثقافة الاحتجاج السلمى والاضرابات فلتكن منظمة وتكون لدينا مؤسسات مجتمع مدنى لديها النضج والشجاعة لتتبنى حدثا بمثل هذا الحجم بدلا من ظهور أحداث عشوائية لا تأمن عواقبها ولانحقق فائدة منها
4/21/2008
Evidence Suggests Soldiers Targeted Reuters Journalist
HRW:The Israeli government should conduct an immediate and independent investigation into the deaths of four civilians, including a Reuters cameraman and two teenage boys, in Gaza on April 16, 2008, Human Rights Watch said today. Human Rights Watch’s investigations at the site found evidence suggesting that an Israeli tank crew fired recklessly or deliberately at the journalist’s team.
“Israeli soldiers did not make sure they were aiming at a military target before firing, and there is evidence suggesting they actually targeted the journalists,” said Joe Stork, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “Israel should investigate these deaths and, if crimes were committed, hold to account those responsible.” Fadel Shana’a, a 23-year-old cameraman employed by Reuters, was killed as he was filming the tank close to Gaza’s border with Israel, southeast of Gaza City. Three other persons were killed as they watched Shana’a filming. The Palestinian Center for Human Rights identified them as Ahmed ‘Aaref Farajallah, 14, Ghassan Khaled Abu ‘Otaiwi, 17, and Khalil Isma’il Dughmosh, 22.
Interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch with an eyewitness to the shelling, a resident in a nearby village and a journalist who arrived just after the attack, as well as camera footage taken by Shana’a, indicate there was no military activity by Palestinian militants at the scene of the attack. On April 16 around 5 p.m., Shana’a was driving with his soundman, Wafa Abu Mizyed, to Johr el-Diek, a village on the eastern edge of the Gaza Strip, to investigate reports of shelling in the area, according to Abu Mizyed. They drove an unarmored gray pickup truck, which, according to Reuters and photographs of the scene, was marked “TV” and “Press” in large colored letters. On their way they passed an Israeli tank that was parked on a hilltop a few hundred meters away. Once in Johr el-Diek, they filmed a group of villagers injured by the fighting, and then left the area by the same road, again passing the Israeli tank. While there was some machine-gun fire in the distance, Abu Mizyed told Human Rights Watch, there was no shooting in their immediate area at the time. Abu Mizyed said they then decided to stop by the roadside to take more video of the surrounding area. Shana’a was wearing a flak jacket with “PRESS” printed in large blue and white letters on the front. Footage from Shana’a’s camera shows an Israeli tank a few hundred meters away firing a shell. About one second later, Shana’a’s camera goes black. “Fadel set up his camera and the tripod and asked me to push away some children who had gathered around us. They were teens and there were no fighters or any shooting there. While I was doing so, I heard a sound like ‘boof,’” Abu Mizyed told Human Rights Watch. “I looked towards Fadel and found him lying on the ground and repeating the Shehada [the Muslim declaration of faith]. I was also injured on my left hand. Fadhel died. Another shell landed behind the truck and injured me in my right hand and the waist. I then ran towards the main road looking for help.” Photographs taken shortly after the incident by a local journalist show teenagers Farajallah and Otaiwi lying dead near the destroyed pickup truck. Minutes after the tank shelling, three other journalists tried to reach the area in an armored jeep. When they stopped their vehicle, marked “Press” in large letters, and walked towards the Reuters vehicle, they also came under tank fire. Wissam Nassar, 23, a photographer for Ma’an news agency, told Human Rights Watch: “We spotted a shell coming towards us from down the street from where the Israeli incursion was taking place. ... We pushed ourselves to the ground when we saw the shell coming. It landed about five meters behind the truck and exploded.” Evidence gathered from the road, and x-rays of the dead and wounded, show the tank fired a flechette shell, which unleashes hundreds of dart-like projectiles before the shell hits the ground. Doctors in Gaza showed the media x-rays of Shana’a’s body, which showed several flechettes lodged in his chest and legs. Several were embedded in his flak jacket. Major Avital Leibovitz, a spokeswoman for the Israeli army, told Human Rights Watch that the site of the incident “is the same area in which three IDF soldiers were killed” about 11 hours earlier. However, she was unable to specify exactly where the soldiers had died and how close that area had been to where the Reuters cameraman was killed. “The matter is being looked into,” she said. “When we have come to a conclusion we will share that information with Reuters.” Human Rights Watch said that the Israeli government should commit to a full independent investigation into the incident, the findings of which would be made public. Three eyewitnesses interviewed separately by Human Rights Watch said there were no hostilities at the time in the immediate area where the cameraman was filming, although there had been fighting earlier that day in Johr el-Diek, which lies about 1.5 kilometers from the site of the attack. “The area where the journalist was killed was open and a bit elevated,” said Stork. “The Reuters truck was clearly marked ‘TV’ and ‘Press’ and drove by the tank twice, so it’s hard to believe the Israeli tank crew didn’t see the pickup contained only journalists.” The laws of war, which apply to the armed hostilities in Gaza, require that parties to the conflict do everything feasible to verify that targets of attack are military objectives. Civilians, including journalists covering a war zone, may never be targeted. Anyone who deliberately or recklessly attacks a civilian commits a war crime. Where there is evidence that a war crime may have been committed, a state has an obligation to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. Human rights groups in Israel and Palestine have long urged the Israeli military to stop using flechette shells in Gaza because they spread over a wide area and are thus more likely to indiscriminately hit civilians. Flechettes are razor-sharp 3.75mm darts released from canisters that explode in mid-air and spray thousands of them in an arc some 300-meters long and 90-meters wide. “The use of flechette shells, with a wide ‘kill radius,’ increases the chance of indiscriminately hitting civilians,” said Stork. “Israel should stop its use of the weapon in Gaza, which is one of the most densely populated areas on earth.”
source: www.hrw.org
4/17/2008
استقلال كوسوفو

لاأفهم لماذا تجاهلت معظم الدول الاسلامية و جميع الدول العربية استقلال دولة كوسوفو ولم تعترف بعا بالرغم من اعتراف ثلثى الاتحاد الاروبى و دول عديد ةوبالرغم من أن هذه الدولة الاسلامية الوليده قدمت تضحيات كثيرة من اجل الاستقلال ,ولم تلقى الدعم الكافى ولم يساعدها احد على هذا الاستقلال سوى صراع النقوذ بين القوى الكبرى الذى قرض خذا الستفلال على صربيا وحليفها الدب الروسى بالرغم من كون هذه الدولةالوليدة اسلامية
والغريب أن دولة مثل تركيا لم تعترف حتى الان بالرغم من كون هذا الاقليم سابقا جزء من الدولة العثمانية
ونجد ان الدولتين الاسلاميتيتن الوحيدتين اللتان اعترفتا باستقلال كوسوقوهما البانيا التى ينتمى سكانها لنفس العرق الذى ينتمى اليه مسلمى كوسوفو وافغانستان التى تخضع سياستها الخارجية للتوجيه الامريكى.
ولكن ماهى الاسباب التى تجعل الدول الاسلامية تتردد فى هذا الاعتراف؟هل هو محاباة للروس؟!!أم رفض تجربة انفصال قابلة للتكرار لاحدى الاقليات فى دولة رغما عن باقى السكان؟ام ماذ وان كانت هذه التجربة يمكن تسويقها كنموذج لفرض استقلال الدولة الفلسطينية, وهذا ما طرحه ياسرعبدربه فى منظة التحرير واستخف به الكثيرون
اتمنى أن تقوم الدول العربية بالاعتراف ودعم استقلال دولة كوسوفو
بل والاستفادة من هذا الاستقلال
!!هى دى مصر يا هانى
بعد اعلان المحكمة لبرائته هتف هانى سرور "هى دى مصر"... بالفعل هى دى مصر.. هى دى مصر الى بيسجن فيها ايمن نور 5 سنوات ويفرج عن تامر حستى المدان بنفس التهمة "مع فارق بسيط انها غير ملفقة!!"
..هى دى مصر الى يطلع فيها هانى سرور براءة فى تفس يوم الحكم على عدد من قيادات الاخوان بعقوبات مشددة عبر محاكمة عسكرية!!
هى دى مصر الى اهتزت فيها قلعة العدالة وسط صراع القضاة الشرفاء ومتسلقى القضاء
هى دى مصر الى بقت رهينة فى ايادى مجموعة من السماسرة
..هى دى مصر الى يطلع فيها هانى سرور براءة فى تفس يوم الحكم على عدد من قيادات الاخوان بعقوبات مشددة عبر محاكمة عسكرية!!
هى دى مصر الى اهتزت فيها قلعة العدالة وسط صراع القضاة الشرفاء ومتسلقى القضاء
هى دى مصر الى بقت رهينة فى ايادى مجموعة من السماسرة
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